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Abstract
We implement a novel method to detect systemically important financial institutions in a
network. The method consists in a simple model of distress and losses redistribution derived
from the interaction of banks’ balance-sheets through bilateral exposures. The algorithm goes
beyond the traditional default-cascade mechanism, according to which contagion propagates
only through banks that actually default. We argue that even in the absence of other
defaults, distressed-but-non-defaulting institutions transmit the contagion through channels
other than solvency: weakness in their balance sheet reduces the value of their liabilities,
thereby negatively affecting their interbank lenders even before a credit event occurs. In this
paper, we apply the methodology to a unique dataset covering bilateral exposures among all
Italian banks in the period 2008-2012. We find that the systemic impact of individual banks
has decreased over time since 2008. The result can be traced back to decreasing volumes in
the interbank market and to an intense recapitalization process. We show that the marginal
effect of a bank’s capital on its contribution to systemic risk in the network is considerably
larger when interconnectedness is high (good times): this finding supports the regulatory
work on counter-cyclical (macroprudential) capital buffers.
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1. Introduction
Over the last decades, the global financial system has become increasingly large and
interconnected. In several countries, a sizable fraction of the growth in the balance sheet of
the financial sector before the crisis could be attributed to mutual claims and obligations
among financial firms. Interconnectedness has been a key factor in precipitating the crisis as
troubles to one financial institution quickly propagated to other entities. In the last quarter
of 2008 a number of markets remained dysfunctional for weeks as investors were kept away
by uncertainty over the actual structure of exposures. Events showed that contagion may
jeopardize the smooth functioning of the global financial system, eventually imposing large
social costs to the entire economy and forcing public authorities to step in. In the economic
literature, network theory has been used to study the financial sector as a complex system of
interlinked agents. Theoretical and empirical works have focused mainly on (i) the assessment
of the likelihood of systemic contagion episodes, (ii) different contagion propagation channels
and (iii) the link between the network topology and the resilience of the system. The vast
majority of contributions investigate the contagion due to direct credit exposure between
two counterparties. When bank i defaults, its creditor, say bank j, faces a loss that is
proportional to the amount lent to bank i and to a certain recovery rate. Whenever the loss
exceeds the equity, bank j also defaults. Bank j propagates the shock to its creditors and
this may trigger a cascade of defaults. A measure of the defaulting banks in the cascade
represents the systemic risk posed by bank i. This approach (contagion through default) fails
to predict large contagion episodes. In particular, networks appear to be resilient up to a very
high threshold (tipping point), defined in terms of the severity of the initial shock. Systemic
events (i.e. a large number of defaults in the cascade) may occur only in the presence of very
large exogenous shocks.
This paper proposes a novel method to study contagion in financial systems. The simple
idea is that distressed-but-non-defaulting institutions transmit contagion before they actu-
ally default. In the previous example, only the default of bank i affects the equity of the
bank j. However, even before a credit event occurs, bank j’s balance sheet might become
weaker: as distance-to-default shortens, the value of bank j liabilities - including interbank
obligations - declines, thereby negatively affecting the creditors of bank j. As creditor banks
themselves become weaker, in turn, they also transmit some degree of contagion to their own
counterparties. As a general result, even if no institution actually fails, the overall system
may become much more fragile, as a non-negligible portion of the network’s equity is likely
to be wiped out in a marked-to-market perspective.
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Our paper aims at assessing the evolution of systemic risk in the Italian interbank network
over the past few years: we analyze a dataset of bilateral exposures obtained from supervisory
reports to the Bank of Italy. In doing so, we modify and improve a novel method put
forward by Battiston et al. (2012), DebtRank, which implements the contagion through
distress idea discussed above. Our measure, DR, is able to measure losses incurred by the
network following the default of each participating bank even when no other default occurs.
For each bank we compute a synthetic indicator - the DR - that expresses the fraction of
the total equity of the network which would be affected by an exogenous shock to the bank.
The basic idea underlying the metric is that whenever a debtor institution is weakened, the
market value of creditor banks equity is affected even before the debtor institution actually
defaults. The DR of an institution proxies its negative externality on the network. The
increase over time of the DR of many individual institutions at the same time is a footprint
of increased fragility of the network. The method is particularly suited at capturing network
externalities as it quantifies systemic risk on a continuous scale and is not limited to the
estimation of the tipping point. Therefore, it can be used to evaluate systemically important
financial institutions and may also represent a benchmark to implement new stress testing
exercises targeting linkages in the financial network other than interbank lending. This is a
brief summary of the main results of the paper:
Traditional indicators underestimate contagion risk. DR captures features of a bank
systemic importance, such as its positioning in the network´s topology, that would not
be apparent under standard default cascades models. In most cases, systemically relevant
institutions under DR would pose no threat to the network if losses were computed through
standard default cascades models.
The DR of Italian banking groups. Systemic risk in the Italian interbank network has
decreased since 2008. The decline is mainly due to decreased interconnectedness in the
unsecured interbank market, as opposed to decreased leverage in the system due to banks´
recapitalization process. Decreased interconnectedness can be traced backed to the sovereign
bond crisis, which dramatically reduced the amount of wholesale funds reaching the domestic
interbank market from international markets. In a sense, a crisis in the interbank market
has become less likely over time as another crisis took place in the sovereign bond markets.
Such a result suggests the existence of a sort of “interconnectedness cycle”: the financial
system is intertwined and contagion risk is high in “normal/good ” times (in our sample
period, before the sovereign debt crisis), the latter decreases with leverage in “bad” times.
Interconnectedness and macroprudential regulation. The evolution over time of the DR
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of Italian banks offers supports the case for counter-cyclical (macroprudential) capital reg-
ulation of banks. Through simple comparative statics, we show that the effect of a bank’s
capital on its systemic risk is much higher when the financial network is tightly intercon-
nected, which is most likely to happen in good times. Counter-cyclical capital buffers as
agreed by the Basel III accord may therefore substantially decrease systemic risk in good
times. On the other hand, the release of the buffer in bad times would have a marginal
impact on financial stability in the network.
Relationship to the literature. Interconnectedness has an ambiguous effect on the
stability of financial systems (Stiglitz (2010)). On the one hand, linkages across agents may
improve risk sharing and help allocating risks to those that are better equipped to bear them.
On the other hand, such linkages swell complexity and ease the propagation of propagation of
contagion if a shock affects the system. Interconnectedness is on the top of the international
reform agenda. Over the past few years, researchers across the board have been working
on the identification of early warning indicators beyond the micro-prudential risk metrics.
Recently the literature proposed different methodologies to measure sources of systemic risk.
Shapley values (Drehmann and Tarashev (2011)), the systemic expected shortfall (Acharya
et al. (2010) ) and CoVaR (Adrian and Brunnermeier (2011)) are among the most relevant
proposals for micro-level indicators that do not rely on network analysis. However, several
critics argued that these asset prices-based indicators might perform well as thermometers
(coincident measures), but not as well as barometers (forward looking indicators). To the
extent that they are backward-looking, these risk metrics are typically at their lowest just
before financial collapse takes place and have therefore little predictive value.
In many cases, these indicators have been proposed to circumvent the lack of data on
the real topology of financial systems and the associated impossibility to identify effective
contagion paths among institutions. As an alternative, network analysis based on real data,
when available, has been widely employed to explore the resilience of the system to conta-
gion of the financial system. These techniques allow to take into account the simultaneous
distribution of risks across agents, beyond the evaluation of the risk-bearing capacity of each
of them. Ultimately, however, the success of network techniques is intimately linked to data
availability and, in turn, new initiatives on data reporting and collection at both national
and international level may be affected by the success of the network approach.
Complex systems in which agents interact can have a simple network representation. In
the specific case of financial networks, each financial institution represents a node and bi-
lateral exposures between financial institutions are the links (or edges). Network analysis
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can be positive or normative. The positive, or static network, analysis allows the character-
ization of the network topology by means of statistical tools. This helps reaching a better
understanding of linkages, hubs and clustering within a financial system. The normative, or
dynamic network, analysis consists in the computation of outcomes that follows from an ini-
tial network structure that is exogenously perturbed. These exercises provide an assessment
of the relationship between the financial system architecture and its stability: results carry
relevant information for regulators, to the extent that they help identifying non-linearities
due to the network structure.
The interest and the number of contributions on financial networks are expanding consid-
erably. Beyond the well established theoretical literature on financial contagion (Allen and
Gale (2000), Freixas et al. (2000), Acemoglu et al. (2012)), the vast majority of empirical
contributions finds that the default of an individual institution is typically not able to trigger
a domino effect (see, e.g., Boss et al. (2004); Elsinger et al. (2003); Furfine (2003), Mistrulli
(2011)6). On the basis of the large sequence of contagion episodes of the recent years, the
adequacy of procedures used to carry out these contagion simulation exercises is under a
severe scrutiny. Recent research tries to fill the gap between the predictions of models of
contagion and the evidence from financial crises. More in detail, standard contagion analyses
in network economies are characterized by a common, basic idea. An initial shock that hits
a region of the network (e.g. a single bank) propagates through interconnected counterpar-
ties. In general, different kinds of shocks (default of a single or a group of entities, market
freeze, macro shock to common risk factors, ...), contagion channels (direct exposures, fire
sales, liquidity hoarding, ...) and indicators to express the systemic importance of individual
institutions have been proposed and analyzed.
Cont et al. (2011) propose to complement the idiosyncratic shock with a macro shock
that reduces the equity positions of all the banks in the network at the same time, reflecting
some sort of common risk exposures. An additional mechanism that may concur to the
aggravation of the contagion is the fire sale of assets from distressed institutions (Cifuentes
et al. (2005), Caballero and Simsek (2009), Shleifer and Vishny (2011)): such a response is
individually rational for a distressed bank, but it imposes a negative externality on other
institutions in the network, depressing asset prices and producing an inefficient aggregate
outcome (Gai and Kapadia (2010)).
6In the specific case of Mistrulli (2011), the paper considers unconsolidated exposures. In other terms, it
focuses on individual banks and not on banking group. In this respect, differently from our work, the paper
neglects the possibility of internal capital markets to efficiently manage the liquidity of the banking group.
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2. Contagion through distress: the DR
Our work proposes a novel method to assess the systemic importance of individual banks.
The key idea is that a clear limitation of contagion through default models is their inability
to account for the fact that, even when the default does not propagate from a bank to its
counterparties, some distress do propagate nevertheless. In this sense, the contagion through
default approach implies an underestimation of the intensity of contagion mechanisms. On
the other hand, regulatory constraints (such as BCBS rules on Large Exposures) should make
the possibility of a default following the failure of a single counterparty highly unlikely.
In our work, we explicitly account for the fact that the bank j importing the contagion
becomes more fragile even in the case its equity is large enough to withstand the loss. The
higher fragility reduces the (market) value of its debt, making (at least) unsecured bank j’s
claimholders more fragile as well. The idea is fully consistent with the Merton’s view on the
market value of the bank’s debt. As a result, even in the absence of subsequent defaults in
the cascade, there can still be a significant systemic impact of an initial adverse shock. The
DR is the measure of systemic risk derived from our contagion through distress mechanism.
It complements traditional methods and provide a measure of the systemic importance of a
bank even when default cascades models predict no impact at all. In particular, the DR is
an extension of the so-called DebtRank algorithm introduced by Battiston et al. (2012). It is
inspired by feedback centrality and takes recursively into account the impact of the distress
of an initial node across the whole network.7
The DR is a measure of the centrality of the bank in the network and quantifies the
propagation and the final outcome in terms of the economic value of the network potentially
affected by the initial shock through the cascade of contagion.
Definition 1. The DR of the bank i expresses the fraction of the total economic value of the
network - excluding the bank i - posed at risk by some exogenous shock that hits the bank i.
It captures the potential negative externality imposed to the network by the bank, excluding
the direct impact of the exogenous shock.
As an illustrative example, let’s compute the DR of the bank i. Consider a simplified
chain of unsecured loans granted by bank k to bank j and by bank j to bank i, whose
amounts are denoted as xkj and xji, respectively. Let Ei, Ej and Ek be the equity of the
7Feedback centrality measures have found successful applications in many domains like rankings in the
world- wide-web (e.g. PageRank). Feedback centrality has a physical analogy with the in-flow in a non-
homogeneous diffusion process.
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three banks and E = Ei + Ej + Ek. In the paper, we use the Tier1 capital. A shock of
size s hits the bank i, the targeted bank, that suffers a loss Li = s. Even when Ei ≥ s, the
bank i is still able to transmit some contagion to bank j as the loss Li erodes its equity and
increase the bank i fragility. In particular, the loss for bank j is taken to be proportional to
the value xji (the loan to bank i) and to the factor hi = min[1, Li/Ei].
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In this way, the algorithm embeds a type of convexity in the distance to default: the
lower the equity Ei, the lower the ability of bank i to absorb the shock, the higher the
contagion it transmits to bank j. The rationale is that the value of bank i’s obligations
decreases as bank i becomes closer to default and the value of its obligations to j declines.
Consider the case in which the initial, exogenous shock is large enough (s > Ei) and the
targeted bank i defaults. The impact on bank j is Wij = min[1, xji/Ej], with Wij = 1 when
the shock that propagates to bank j is large enough to knock the bank j down. The shock
propagates along the contagion path and reaches the bank k. The impact on the latter is
Wjk = min[1,Wijxkj/Ek]. In this simplified case, the DR of bank i is equal to:
DRi = Wij
Ej
E − Ei + Wjk
Ek
E − Ei (1)
After simple manipulations we get:
DRi =
1
E − Ei
[
xji +
xji
Ej
xkj
]
(2)
The first addendum in the brackets is the loss induced to bank j; the second is the loss
to bank k, derived as the impact xik/Ej transmitted by bank j and the exposures of bank
k to bank j. The overall loss to the network (the number of the expression in brackets)
is divided by the total equity of the system, to have a measure of the relative disruption
induced by the bank i on the network. Capital plays as a buffer that smooths the effects of
the initial shock to i along the cascade. In general, in a more complex network, bank k may
have several debtors that, as bank j, are exposed to the contagion from bank i. Following
the initial shock to bank i, at each iteration of the algorithm, some banks down the chain
are affected. The sum of the losses occurred to these banks, at each iteration, is used to
calculate the DR of the bank i.
One major refinement of our paper is that we explicitly account for a measure of riskiness
8Note that when the Li > Ei the bank i defaults. We assume that in the short run the recovery rate is
negligible and the value of its liabilities drops to zero.
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of the bank’s assets. Indeed, two banks may have the same leverage (ratio of total assets to
equity) but the composition of the asset side may differ substantially. More in detail, in the
previous example, the impact of bank j to bank k is
Wˆjk = min[1, cj Wˆijxkj/Ek]
where
cj =
Average Tier1 ratio
Tier1 ratio of bank j
where, as standard, the Tier1 ratio is defined as the ratio of Tier1 capital to Risk-Weighted
Assets. The coefficient c captures the riskiness of the bank relative to an overall average,
across banks and time; c acts as a buffer (it is lower than 1) for banks with a Tier1 ratio
above the average, and as an amplification mechanism for the others.
Finally, the method gets rid of possible infinite reverberations that can arise due to the
presence of loops (i.e. xjk > 0 and xkj > 0). In these cases, the contagion may bounce
several times between bank j and k, potentially until one or both default. To avoid this
problem, walks in which one or more edges are repeated more than once are excluded. At
each step t (the step is the time when the shock directly or indirectly reaches the node),
to the generic bank j we associate a state variable Sj that can take three values Inactive,
Distressed, Undistressed, so that:
Sj(t) =

Inactive if Sj(t− 1) = Distressed
Distressed if hj(t− 1) > 0 and Sj(t− 1) 6= Inactive
Undistressed otherwise
(3)
The algorithm stops when all banks are either in the Undistressed or the Inactive state.
3. Data description
Interbank linkages are the plumbing of financial markets. Exposures are surveyed within
the supervisory reports submitted monthly to the Bank of Italy. The historical depth of the
dataset hinges upon the continuity of data collection method: in principle, all information is
available on a monthly basis at least since the early 2000. However, the subsequent adoption
of different reporting templates complicates the coherent reconstruction of phenomena, for
which it may be necessary an aggregation of different technical forms. Taking into account
these difficulties, at this stage we have chosen to focus our preliminary analysis on unsecured
interbank relationships, from 2008 on. The resulting representation of the interbank market
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is a weighted and directed network, namely a set of nodes (banks) that are linked to each
other through different types of financial instruments (edges). The direction of the link goes
from the bank i having a liability to the bank j claiming the liability, and the weight is
the amount of the unsecured liabilities of i towards j. All data are available on a legal
entity basis, due to the regulatory purposes of the reporting. However, given the deeply
interrelated nature of financial markets and the significant concentration process which has
been undergoing in the past decade, both at the Italian and international level, we assume
that the economic agents underneath each transaction lie at the group level. For this reason,
in the first round of analysis we choose to consolidate individual data, leaving for a later
stage the analysis of the groups’ internal capital market. Finally, in our exercises we use
balance sheet information (e.g. total assets, core tier1 capital,...) from supervisory reports
and ad hoc data gathering, that are available both on a solo basis and a banking group level.
For a complete description of the Italian interbank network, see Bargigli et al. (2013).
4. The DR of Italian banking groups
4.1. The DR versus contagion through default
We compare our DR measure with the simplest, traditional indicator of systemic risk in
financial networks, namely the effects of a default of a bank in terms of other defaults in
the cascade. In Figure 1, these effects are measured as the ratio between the total equity
of banks that default in the cascade over the equity of the network. Only in few cases the
exogenous default of a bank brings about the default of other banks in the network and the
overall impact in terms of equity is small (in the worst case, it is about 2% of the total equity
of the system, against almost 18% for the DR measure).
Result 1. The DR differs substantially from indicators based exclusively on contagion-through-
default.
The DR is reported on the vertical axis. The horizontal axis shows the effect to the
network of a default of a bank, in terms of the fraction of the total equity of the network
that is lost when we restrict to contagion-through-default. Clearly, the DR predicts sizable
effects whereas the other measure typically shows no impact at all.
4.2. The DR before and after the sovereign debt crisis
Figures 2-6 report the DR of individual banks from 2008 to 2012. Graphs have a simple
interpretation. Each dot represents a banking group (consolidated data have been used,
9
netting out infra-group relationships). The horizontal axis reports the size of the bank,
measured with its total assets (in millions of euros). The DR is reported on the vertical axis
and, in this case, is expressed as the fraction of the total equity of the system potentially
wiped out by an initial shock to a bank. In the DR computation, we exclude the direct
effect of the exogenous shock that hits the equity of the targeted bank. In this particular
case, we plot the DR of the bank associated to an exogenous shock that brings about the
default of the bank. The size of the dot depends on the interbank lending and borrowing of
the banking group with the network. Finally, the color of the dot represents the tier1 capital
ratio of the banking group.
Result 2. The DR of Italian banking groups has generally decreased since 2008.
The decline of the DR is very clear for medium and large banks. It is due to decreasing
interbank volumes exchanged in the unsecured market and to a quite intense process of banks
recapitalization (Figure 7).
Both phenomena reflect a global trend. However, while the sign of the impact of the two
trends on the DR is the same, they have polar opposite interpretations from a financial stabil-
ity perspective. Indeed, on the one hand, the proper functioning of the unsecured interbank
market is essential for an efficient use of liquidity within the financial system. The unsecured
interbank market dry-up during the sovereign debt crisis and the migration towards collater-
alized (often ECB) funding have been a widespread phenomenon in the Euro area periphery.
The spike in the spreads between interbank rates and overnight index swap rates almost
worldwide is a clear footprint. Acharya and Merrouche (2010) and Christensen et al. (2009)
find a precautionary hoarding motive for the sudden dry-up of money markets. Conversely,
in Taylor and Williams (2008) the key driver is the sizable increase in counterparty risk.
Regardless the underlying cause, a decline in the volume exchanged in the interbank market
is generally perceived as the symptom of a disease and represents a major concern for a
smooth functioning of funding markets and for the transmission of monetary policy signals.
The decreasing activity in the domestic interbank market follows a generalized dry-up of
cross border flows, which has been particularly severe for some Euro Area economies over
the 2010-2011 period (BIS Quarterly Review, June 2012): Italian institutions were quite
dependent on this source of funding that supported a portion of the domestic interbank
market and they had to resort to retail funding and to the Eurosystem to replace some of
their maturing wholesale liabilities. On the other hand, the regulatory response following
the global financial crisis has also pushed for a recapitalization of most institutions. One
major example is the European Banking Authority EU-wide capital exercise, that led to
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an increase of EU banks’ capital positions of more than 200 billions of euros. The average
leverage levels (core capital) for Italian banks have significantly decreased (increased) over
the 2007-2011 period.
A decline of the DR due to stronger balance sheets is desirable; the same conclusion
cannot be drawn when the systemic risk declines because the traditional flows of liquidity
are impaired and the entire system is more dependent on central bank funding. We disen-
tangle the two effects with a simple comparative statics exercise (Figure 8), running the DR
algorithm on two “mixed” networks. The first one is made up with unsecured interbank
exposures at Dec-2008 (when they were relatively high) and with banks’ capital levels at
Dec-2012 (relatively high). In the second exercise, the DR is computed using exposures at
Dec-2012 (relatively low) and capital levels at Dec-2008 (relatively low).
We can quantify the impact of more robust balance sheets on systemic risk when banks
are more interconnected (Dec. 2008) and compare it with the effect of capital when volume
exchanged in the network are lower (Dec. 2012). Comparing the two panels of the left
column of Figure 8, the effect of recapitalization on systemic risk is clearly noticeable when
the interbank market functions properly, private liquidity flows are significant and intercon-
nectedness is high. On the contrary, comparing the panels of the right column, the effect of
higher capital in a low-interconnected network seems much less significant.
4.3. Interconnectedness and macroprudential regulation
A new macroprudential orientation of financial regulation has been undoubtedly one
of the key directions of the reform roadmap. Microprudential regulatory frameworks, by
focusing on the soundness of financial institutions taken in isolation and disregarding the
effects of macroeconomic variables, interlinkages and exposures to common risk factors, have
been identified for contributing factors for the run-up of the crisis. In the new perspective,
authorities are called to actively manage capital regulation along the business cycle.
In this section, we use our network approach to financial fragility to investigate the link
between bank’s capital and systemic risk. In particular, we focus on the ability of capital to
reduce the systemic risk imposed by the bank to the financial network through contagion.
In our view, the results of this section provide a solid argument in favor of a counter-cyclical
capital buffer in line with the Basel III Accord. In the spirit of the reform, the buffer would
be properly imposed (released) in the expanding (contracting) phase of the business cycle.
Our approach captures one particular aspect of the cycle, namely the “interconnectedness
cycle”: during the crisis many links in the interbank unsecured market have been replaced
by central bank funding.
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In terms of the algorithm, in all exercises presented so far, in order to compute the DR
of the bank, we impose an initial shock that brings about the default of the bank. One
undesirable consequence of this approach is that the capital of the bank i, by construction,
cannot affect the DR of the bank i: regardless the financial fragility of the bank, the initial
shock always induces the default. In this section, we introduce two variations.
1. The initial exogenous perturbation to the bank takes the form of shocks of different
size distributed with some probability density function. More in detail, while in the
baseline DR computation the initial shock is the default of the targeted bank i, in
the exercise presented in this section we hit bank i with a number of shocks, one at a
time, and for each shock we run the DR algorithm. Then, to each shock corresponds a
number that represents the equity of the network that is potentially wiped out. Finally,
we compute a weighted average of these numbers, using the Normal probability density
function to obtain the weights (in other terms, the effects of very small and very large
shocks have a lower weight). One major effect of this exercise is that the bank i’s
capital directly affects bank i’s DR.
2. We compute the DR of the bank assuming an increase (call it DR+) and a decrease
(call it DR-) of the bank’s effective capital by the 20%. The outputs are two values,
namely DR+ and DR-, for each bank (at each date). The deviation of the DR from
the DR+ (DR-) represents the effect of an increase (decrease) of the bank’s capital on
its systemic risk.
Result 3. The impact of capital on systemic risk is higher when the network is intercon-
nected. This result supports the desirability of a counter-cyclical capital regulation of banks.
More in detail, for each bank, we first compute the difference between the DR and DR+.
The blue line in Figure 9 represents the evolution over time of the average value of this
difference for the top 5 banking groups, where December 2008 is taken as a reference point.
The red line is the same indicator for other medium/large banking groups.9
The impact of capital on systemic risk decreases substantially in the midst of the sovereign
debt crisis, with the dry-up of unsecured interlinkages. This result has a straightforward
implication in terms of capital regulation: authorities should be encouraged to actively
adjust capital regulation across the cycle as even small increases of the requirement (the
9The corresponding figures for the difference between DR- and the DR are almost perfectly identical,
suggesting a symmetric effect of the imposition and the release of the buffer, at each date.
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accumulation of a counter-cyclical capital buffer) in good times generate significant effects
in terms of reduction of the systemic risk. At the same time, the buffer may be released in
bad times, with an almost negligible increase of the systemic risk.
4.4. Size, interconnectedness and DR
The regulatory approach to systemic risk is changing. Several regulatory reforms are cur-
rently underway in all major jurisdictions worldwide and at the international level. These
reforms aim not only at increasing the capital and liquidity requirements for financial institu-
tions but, in some cases, at transforming the architecture of the financial system by imposing
constraints on activities and types of exposures. At the international level, the Basel III pro-
posal envisages an additional capital buffer for global systemically important banks (G-SIBs)
and, more broadly, for systemically important financial institutions (SIFIs).10 The G-SIB
surcharges will cope with the potential impact of an institution failure on the global financial
system and the wider economy. Interestingly, the focus of the Basel Committee goes beyond
the size of the financial institution and encompasses some measure of interconnectedness. In
the proposal, the latter is captured using three indicators, intra-financial system assets and
liabilities11, intra-financial system liabilities12 and the wholesale funding ratio. The proposal
surely represents a step forward. However, for each institution, the scores for the first two
indicators are calculated on the basis of the aggregate claims and obligations towards the rest
of the financial network. Our analysis emphasis the limits of measures based on aggregate
exposures and that neglect the topology of the network.
Result 4. The DR captures features of the systemic importance of a bank that go beyond
leverage, capital, size and interconnectedness.
As one would expect, the DR and the size of the bank are positively related. This is
mostly due to economies of scale in market making activity. In general, one important caveat
in the interpretation of the relationship between size and systemic risk is that we confine
the analysis to the domestic interbank market. Large institutions are more able to capture
10Consultation material can be found at http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs207.htm.
11Lending to financial institutions (including undrawn committed lines), holdings of securities issued by
other financial institutions, net mark to market reverse repurchase agreements with other financial institu-
tions, net mark to market securities lending to financial institutions and net mark to market OTC derivatives
with financial institutions.
12Deposits by financial institutions (including undrawn committed lines), all marketable securities issued
by the bank, net mark to market repurchase agreements with other financial institutions, net mark to market
securities borrowing from financial institutions and net mark to market OTC derivatives with financial
institutions.
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funds in the cross-border interbank market thanks to higher visibility. Therefore, the whole
picture that includes foreign linkages would be different, especially in the first months of
our sample period, due to the intense cross-border interbank activity. For this reason, in
an extension of the exercise to the whole Euro area network, we would expect an increase
of the systemic risk posed by large banking groups. However, the relationship between size
and DR is absolutely non linear and banks with similar size may show very different DR
values. Interconnectedness plays a key role in determining the systemic risk of a bank.
Institutional features and banks’ business models may help explain the relatively high DR
of some medium-size institutions. They operate as a liquidity hub of regional networks of
very small, mostly co-operative banks.13
The systemic relevance of these banks is tied to the significant number of institutions
that would be involved in the distress-cascade, despite the relatively low size of their trades.
In particular, the increase of their DR is due to larger unsecured borrowing by co-operative
banks from ICCREA, their liquidity pool, that had access to ECB funding through the first
Long Term Refinancing Operation (LTRO).
5. Conclusions
In this work we try to put forward a new class of stress-testing techniques that (i) accounts
for non-linearities in contagion propagation that are typical of network-based models and
(ii) allows to identify systemically relevant institutions beyond default–cascade models. We
applied the methodology to a unique dataset of bilateral exposures in the Italian interbank
market.
Our results show that traditional indicators underestimate contagion risk. Our measure,
DR, captures features of a bank’s systemic relevance that would not be apparent under
standard default cascades models. DR estimates for the Italian banking system show that
systemic risk in the interbank network has decreased significantly since 2008. However, the
decline is mainly due to the fact that a crisis has indeed happened somewhere else in the
financial system, namely in the sovereign bond market, as opposed to increased capitalization
of the banking system. Such evidence strongly supports policy options in line with Basel
III such as counter-cyclical capital buffers for banks: the effect of a bank’s capital on its
systemic risk is much higher when the financial network is tightly interconnected, which is
13Figure 10 reports interbank exposures and Tier1 capital for Italian banking groups, classified with respect
to their size.
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most likely to happen in good times, its impact decreases with leverage in “bad” times.
Extensions of the current setting to liquidity-run contagion could complement policy-
makers discussion on countercyclical liquidity insurance fees.
List of Figures
Figure 1: DR versus contagion-through-default. Each dot is an Italian banking group. Vertical axis: DR;
horizontal axis: impact on the network measured with the equity loss, considering exclusively contagion-
through-default. Dot size: interbank lending and borrowing relative to total assets. December 2008.
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Figure 2: The DR of Italian Banking Groups at December 2008. Vertical axis: DR; horizontal axis: total
assets; dot size: interbank lending and borrowing; dot color: Tier1 ratio.
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Figure 3: The DR of Italian Banking Groups at December 2009. Vertical axis: DR; horizontal axis: total
assets; dot size: interbank lending and borrowing; dot color: Tier1 ratio.
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Figure 4: The DR of Italian Banking Groups at December 2010. Vertical axis: DR; horizontal axis: total
assets; dot size: interbank lending and borrowing; dot color: Tier1 ratio.
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Figure 5: The DR of Italian Banking Groups at December 2011. Vertical axis: DR; horizontal axis: total
assets; dot size: interbank lending and borrowing; dot color: Tier1 ratio.
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Figure 6: The DR of Italian Banking Groups at December 2012. Vertical axis: DR; horizontal axis: total
assets; dot size: interbank lending and borrowing; dot color: Tier1 ratio.
Figure 7: Interbank exposures and Tier1 capital of Italian banking groups (millions of euros).
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Figure 8: Lower volumes and higher capital. Top/left: DR at Dec. 2008. Top/right: DR at Dec. 2011.
Bottom/left: DR with Tier1 of Dec. 2012 and exposures of Dec. 2008. Bottom/right: DR with exposures
of Dec. 2012 and Tier1 of Dec. 2008. Vertical axis: DR; horizontal axis: total assets; dot size: interbank
exposures; dot color: Tier1 ratio.
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Figure 9: The impact of capital on the DR of top 5 and other medium/large Italian banking groups.
Dec 2008=100. Shock range =[1% - 15%] of total assets, interval between two successive shocks = 1%.
Probabilities of the shocks are taken from a Normal distribution, with mean= 5% and std deviation = 0.1.
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Figure 10: Interbank exposures (top panel) and Tier1 capital (bottom panel) by bank size measured with
total assets (TA, in millions of euros).
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6. Reverberations
In this paper we follow the DR methodology (Battiston et al. (2012)) and exclude second
order reverberation in loops. To clarify the issue, consider Figure (11), with a simplified
financial network, with 8 banks that interact through mutual exposures. Assume bank1
defaults following some exogenous event. For sake of simplicity, the contagion is taken to be
h = 0.5 for all exposures. What is key as regards reverberations, is the contagion between
bank 2 and bank 5, for instance. These two banks form a loop, as bank 2 is exposed to bank
5 and vice versa. In the cascade, the contagion may potentially reverberate ad infinitum or,
at least, until one or both banks default. In the present version of the paper, we consider
only one reverberation, excluding from the computation of the DR all the paths that have
been already visited.
Figure 11: Reverberations (read clockwise from the top-left).
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